



The Necessity of Dogma

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Source: *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Jan., 1895), pp. 147-162

Published by: [The University of Chicago Press](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2375147>

Accessed: 15/12/2014 00:28

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struction, cannot move it from the pier until some ordinary man goes into the hold and carries on the laborious work of the stoker, and for the man who has spent his millions in the construction of the magnificent machine to attempt to crush or to own the stoker is a violation of every principle of ethics. The stoker is entitled not only to the very best treatment of the man who owns the machine, but to his sincere regard and respect, and until this principle is recognized, through the claim of the stoker for the respect of the man who has built the ship and the freely accorded claim on his part, there will be no settlement and no adjustment of labor troubles.

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THE NECESSITY OF DOGMA.*

I OUGHT perhaps to start with a definition of dogma. But I shall not endeavor, and, indeed, I do not desire or seek to find a very accurate or appropriate one, for I wish to consider an idea which is essentially popular,—I might even say fashionable,—the idea that dogma is not essential to religion nor to our own well-being. In dealing with ideas which are in the air,—which seems equivalent to being in the magazines,—any very great accuracy of definition would be hopeless pedantry. For the purposes of this paper, however, I think we may fairly take dogma as comprising all propositions as to the real nature of things which neither fall within the range of physical and mental science on the one side or of morals on the other. Dogma, as used by the writers whom I wish to consider, depends upon the subject-matter and not on the evidence. The Athanasian Creed and Hegel's Logic are alike dogma. The immortality of the individual or the unreality of matter are dogmas; but the law of gravitation and the duty of honesty are not dogmas, for they deal with experience, and dogmas deal with what is beyond and behind experience, if anything there be which is beyond and behind it.

* A lecture delivered before the London Ethical Society.

I venture to maintain two propositions: the first is that religion is impossible without a basis of dogma, the second is that the existence of dogma, and of dogma of a particular nature, is of vital importance to the character of our life,—that on the possession of certain dogmas depends the decision whether we are to regard ourselves and the world as a success or as a failure.

I freely admit that it would be very desirable if we could avoid this conclusion. If only we *could* introduce order and harmony into our lives by the aid of science and morals alone it would be much to be desired, for if we look around we find clearly in science and morals both certainty and progress. Doubtless there is always a margin of uncertainty in science,—a set of questions raised but not answered. Perhaps the number of propositions which are now in this doubtful land is larger than it used to be. But this is only because they are raised more quickly than they are answered. And they are answered. Problem after problem is solved, and the solution becomes the common and undoubted property of mankind. The advance of science and the certainty of its results are beyond all doubt. What it all means is a very different question, but we cannot deny it is there to mean something.

And in morals the certainty, though not so striking as with science, is still very marked. It is, no doubt, to some extent, as Mr. Balfour told the Cambridge Society, exaggerated, but it is still all-important. If we compare the disagreement of men's opinions on any metaphysical point—the existence of God, of matter, of immortality, of design—with the agreement as to the general duty—and even as to the details—of honesty, of truthfulness, of courage, we shall find the balance overwhelmingly in favor of the latter. Nor can we doubt that to some extent our moral ideas are advancing on a path of inherent development,—becoming more subtle, more comprehensive, more coherent.

Compare all this with dogma. If we take the religion which claims to be revealed, we find not a single proposition laid down which is not challenged as eagerly and bitterly as it is asserted, nor does there appear any chance of discovering

a common ground upon which it would be possible to settle the question; and if metaphysics is better off, it is better off to very little practical purpose. It is, indeed, erroneous to the verge of absurdity to deny that it advances. But it only advances in the sense that it changes the battle-ground, not by settling any question finally. The questions evolve into different forms, but the answers are still various. We may hope that the long contest will eventually develop into a form when opposition may cease, and that we shall at last put the question of all questions in the form that will wring an answer from the universe. Personally, I believe that this will come. I even agree with those who think they can discern the first faint signs of its coming. But the goal must at the best be distant, and many fail to see any hope that it can ever be reached. For many centuries to come, we must resign ourselves to the fact that where we have dogma we shall have division.

Dispute without any particular hope of reconciliation is bad at all times,—worst of all when, as must always be the case to some extent with subjects so vital and so deep-reaching, it implies not only intellectual but spiritual discord. If we could put dogma altogether on one side, or confine it to the studies and lecture-rooms of divines and philosophers; if we could say that in spite of dogmatic divisions and doubt we could still have religious unity and certainty, still lack no element for a significant and happy life, then the world might surely count itself fortunate.

But to do this is, I fear, impossible, for it would ignore, as I shall endeavor to prove, something which is essential to religion and essential to our acquiescence in and approval of our own life as ultimately and absolutely worth living, and this something is the sense of complete harmony. Not merely of complete harmony of the universe regarded as a single whole. Science will give us some reason to believe in a certain harmony of the universe with itself, though it may be doubted whether that harmony would stand a close examination. But we require something more. The question arises whether the universe is in harmony with ourselves. That we,

as part of the universe, form part of its harmony cannot be denied. But, from our own point of view at any rate, we are more than this. We can conceive ourselves not as parts, but as individuals; not as means but as ends. We can place ourselves on one side and the universe on the other, and we can, and we must, ask whether from this opposition there results harmony or discord.

To put the matter in another way, we find in ourselves two independent and ultimate tests and predicates of all reality. We can ask of everything, in the first place, Is it true? and, in the second place, Is it good? These two questions are independent and ultimate. Neither of them, as Mr. Balfour has brilliantly shown in the "Defence of Philosophic Doubt," can be made to depend on the other. Nothing is true merely because it is good. Nothing is good merely because it is true. To argue that a thing must be because it ought to be is the last and worst degree of spiritual rebellion,—claiming for our ideals the reality of fact. To argue, on the other hand, that a thing must be good because it is true, is the last and worst degree of spiritual servility, which ignores the right and the duty inherent in our possession of ideals,—the right and the duty to judge and, if necessary, to condemn the whole universe by the highest standard we can find in our own nature.

We have thus a divided allegiance. We are bound to own the truth as truth, however horrible or despicable it may be. We are bound to own the good as good, however impossible it may be to obtain it, however certainly the whole current of the universe may be running the other way. Each is supreme in its own sphere. But the difficulty is that the sphere of each comprehends the entire universe. It is clear at first sight that of any conceivable thing the question may be asked, Is it true? And we must take good in the wider sense, not of moral virtue alone, but of all that we desire,—true good being that which we long for, not from caprice or accident, but from the essential nature of our being. And then, since in a single universe no one fact can be without influence on any other, there can be nothing which does not

either help or hinder the attainment of our aspirations,—nothing which must not be pronounced either good or bad.

It follows, then, that the only possibility of a real harmony in our point of view towards the universe will lie in a conviction that whatever is in the long run true is also in the long run good, or, as Hegel expresses it, that what is real is righteous and what is righteous is real. Otherwise we shall find it impossible to escape a position of pessimism; we shall be forced to pronounce that the real is not good, and that our aspirations are doomed, to some extent, not to be realized. Reality will seem unsatisfactory, goodness will seem empty and hopeless, and we shall find ourselves driven to admit that nature and ourselves are discordant and inharmonious.

Now pessimism, as it appears to me, is incompatible with what is properly called religion. Religion, I suppose it will be generally admitted, is a mental attitude or disposition of some sort; and I believe I shall be in accordance with general opinion if I go on to say that it must at least be an attitude of acquiescence towards the universe: of confidence, however reached, that the 'supreme power which governs events makes for righteousness; that the ultimate reality is worth not only our fear, but our admiration; that cheerful acceptance of the fate that befalls us is not merely a degrading submission to a power stronger than we are, but rather an ennobling recognition in that power of the perfection and realization of all our ideals and aspirations.

That the common idea of religion includes at least this is obvious from the fact that the ordinary definition of religion would require a belief in some supreme being who is not only feared but worshipped, who is conceived not only as stronger than his devotees but as more admirable. The assumption of a beneficent deity, so far as it is thoroughly realized, is clearly a way, the shortest and simplest way, of insuring that truth and goodness shall coincide. The only belief to which the name religion is generally accorded, which does not ascribe the existence of the universe to a power working for righteousness, is Buddhism. And even here the

acquiescence is gained, though in a different way, for although the universe, in so far as it exists, is held by Buddhism to be essentially evil, yet it teaches that the constitution of the universe provides a way for each of us by which we can escape from its tyranny to the shelter of annihilation. Reality, in itself a curse, becomes a blessing, in so far as it points the way to its own negation.

Other definitions of religion have, however, been proposed, and especially, in some cases, with the object of rendering religion independent of dogma. I shall therefore endeavor, in the first place, to show that, if we accept this definition of religion, dogma is indispensable to it; and, in the second place, that if we define religion so as not to include this acquiescence in the universe as a whole, we must at any rate admit that our attitude towards the ultimate questions of life must, in the absence of dogma, be one either of indifference or of despair.

If we reject dogma, we have still left, on the one hand, science, on the other, morality, including not only the pursuit of virtue in the stricter sense, but also the pursuit of knowledge and of beauty, in so far as we consider them desirable ends for man. Can we base an attitude of acquiescence in the universe on either of these? Let us take science first. Does science give us any ground to regard the universe as morally desirable, or its creator, if it have one, as morally admirable? I conceive that it gives us no such ground.

Taking the question, in the first place, generally, we find that science demands, and from its stand-point rightly demands, that all conscious life, including our own, should be regarded as the effect of the merely mechanical and physical laws of matter and motion. If this is the case, it follows that, since no part of the universe is determined to exist as fact, by those laws which we lay down for the universe in our aspirations and desires, or by any laws of a similar nature, it can merely be by chance that any harmony exists between those aspirations and the facts. The chances are, in the strictest sense of the word, infinitely against a complete concurrence of the two, and even if the infinitely improbable

event happened, we could scarcely pronounce the outside universe to be righteous merely because a blind chance led it to fulfil the postulates of righteousness.

And even if we do not, as I think we must, take science as postulating a materialistic monism, we must at the least admit that it requires a dualism, and is incompatible with an idealistic monism. Even if, that is, it could be induced to abandon its claim to treat the *prima facie* spiritual as really material, it could not be induced to allow that the *prima facie* material was really spiritual. Supposing we could hold, on the basis of science alone, that mind was not merely matter,—and I do not think that science would allow us even this concession,—still, we could not possibly hold that matter was merely mind. Now, I do not see how in this case we can possibly admit that the universe is righteous, for we are conditioned by matter all around us. We are never free from its influence. And if matter is governed by non-spiritual laws, the chances must again be infinity to one that it will to some degree thwart the nature of spirit. Revealed religion escapes this difficulty by the hypothesis of a beneficent deity, who so arranges and controls matter as to render it compatible with, and even subservient to, the realization of righteousness in the universe. Metaphysical idealism escapes it by maintaining that matter is essentially of the nature of spirit, and will in the long run be found in harmony with it. But each of these courses involves the forbidden dogma. And without them it seems impossible to suppose that spirit is not in some degree thwarted by facts outside it,—impossible, therefore, to regard the universe as righteous, since it is subjected to a necessity which has no regard for the good as such, because it has no law common to it with those laid down by our moral nature.

To look again at the matter from a more concrete point of view. It can scarcely be denied, I think, that we demand permanence somewhere, that a universe in which everything was doomed to destruction was not one which we could regard as satisfactory. Now, from the point of view of science, for what have we the right to expect this perma-

nence, except perhaps for mere dead matter? The latter may perhaps be put out of account. As Mill is reported to have replied to an enthusiastic positivist, it is rather cold comfort to look forward to our whole civilization being eventually transmuted into an infinitesimal augmentation of the temperature of infinite space. And what else is there? Science certainly gives us no reason to suppose that we can survive the death of our bodies. That conviction must be found in dogma, if it is to be found at all. And as for the race. Even if we could suppose it permanent, it would scarcely be a satisfactory ideal, when the lives of the individuals of whom it is made up were fragmentary and unsatisfactory. But we cannot suppose it permanent, for science, I conceive, insists that the temperature compatible with human life is only a very transitory phase in the existence of a planet. And, besides, even if science could promise us immortality, either for the individual or for the race, would such an immortality be worth having? For our dissatisfaction with a finite and limited life is scarcely to be removed by an endless aggregation of finitudes. The only result of such a process—the best science could offer us—would be, I fear, that the unsatisfactory element would be infinitely multiplied, and that the life which was trivial and inadequate when it had an end would not be improved merely by being lengthened. There *is* a conception of eternity which might perhaps satisfy our cravings,—the eternity which is as much in a moment as in a thousand years, the infinity which shows itself more clearly in one of us than in the whole physical universe,—but this, too, is on the forbidden ground. Metaphysic knows it, and pays the penalty for her folly in the contempt of all sensible people! Theology has dreamed that time may be no more. But science knows better. She proudly wears the badges of the finite. If men are so foolish as to long for the infinite, so much the worse for them.

To sum up, then, we have no reason to believe that because a thing is good it will be true, and we have very definite reasons for believing that some things which are good are not true. This is the result of science. And it follows that we

have two alternatives. The one is to pronounce the universe to be morally admirable because it is physically stronger than we are. If we suppose the universe, or its creator, to be endowed with a lively sense of personal dignity, this course is unquestionably prudent, but scarcely to be recommended on other grounds. The other is to deny to the universe any right to be regarded as in any sense admirable or good; and in that case our acquiescence in it must be impossible; the good and the true will be not only independent but contradictory, and religion, in the sense in which we are now using the word, will be replaced by defiance or despair.

Can we, then, get to a position of greater peace and harmony from morality only? Again, I think not. No doubt, independent of any rationality or righteousness in the universe, morality still remains binding. The idea of the good is valid for us. If it is not valid for the universe, so much the worse for the universe. No doubt, too, however much we believed that the stars in their courses were fighting against us, we might, in carrying out the demands of our own nature, and in striving to make the best of such an extremely bad business as the universe would then be, feel not only enthusiasm, but a certain amount of pleasure. But it could not give us the sense of harmony with the universe. It sounds plausible, at first, to say that the possession of virtue ought to console us for everything, and that, therefore, we have only to be virtuous to feel in harmony with the universe, since with the virtuous man no external element can disturb his happiness or, consequently, affect the harmony. But we must remember that in proportion as we are devoted to virtue we care for its success, and are therefore considerably affected by a world which denies success to it. A man who was so excessively virtuous that the defeat of virtue in all its endeavors was a matter of entire indifference to him, would be more psychologically interesting than logically consistent. And, again, not only the virtuous man himself, but other people are subject to the decrees of fate. A virtue which was so intense that it rendered us indifferent to the sufferings of others would almost have passed into its opposite. Of course, if we

suppose that those sufferings are part of some plan which on the whole works for happiness, we may trust the event, and not despair or condemn because of them,—but such a trust that “good will be the final end of ill” would take us once more into the forbidden precincts of dogma.

Nor do we escape the difficulty by saying that if these other people also had been virtuous they would have been happy. Even if this were so, it only deepens the tragedy of the situation, if truth means, not only that men are unhappy, but also that they are wicked. Nor do we avoid it by saying that their wickedness is their own fault, even if that were true, for the difficulty is that there is a want of harmony between the universe and our ideals, and that is not removed by any decision as to what being in the universe is responsible for the want. Whose ever the fault may be, the want of harmony is there. And how are we to deal with beings not yet high enough for this stoical virtue? Granted—and it is granting a good deal—that the contemplation of the moral imperative could solace a man,—say in the spasms of hydrophobia,—it would be unreasonable to expect such devotion to the ideal from a dog or a guinea-pig. And then how is their pain to be prevented from destroying the harmony?

Pain is an evil,—all our morality implies that. Even if we have a right to forgive the universe our own pain,—and I doubt if we have the right to do even this,—we have certainly no right to forgive it the pain of others. We must either believe the pain inflicted for some good purpose, or condemn the universe in which it occurs. But the first is certainly not obvious on the surface, and therefore requires dogma, and the second means utter pessimism. Can Natural Religion provide us with a third alternative?

Surely, the more keenly we desire the good, the more keenly we must condemn a universe which baffles and thwarts our desires. And if neither science nor morality can make a religion by itself, still less can they do so together. If the true and the good are discrepant, the more enthusiastically they are pursued, the more obvious and painful would be the want of harmony. Their reconciliation might indeed form

the basis of a religion. But since, as I have endeavored to show, they are in themselves inconsistent, they can only be reconciled by something outside them, and, alas, the only thing outside them is the much-condemned dogma.

We must now meet a modified position. No doubt, it is said, especially by the author of "Natural Religion" and "Ecce Homo," no doubt this religion, which we get from science and morals, is inferior to a religion obtained from revelation or metaphysics, which should enable us to say that the supremely true is the supremely good. But still it is an approximation to it, it is only quantitatively behind it, and it is worth having if you can't get anything better. The God revealed in science "is also the God of Christians. That the God of Christians is something more does not affect this fact."* This I deny. The God of Christians is held by them, whether justifiably or not, to be not only the deepest reality, but the highest perfection we can conceive. The God of science, on the other hand, if you are to strain language so far as to call him a God, falls very short of such perfection. No doubt you may say that, since the philosophical and theological idea of God implies complete symmetry and order, and science shows a certain symmetry and order under the lower categories, that the difference is from one point of view quantitative. But then this difference becomes, in its effect on religion, qualitative. The difference between an ounce or a pound of bread a day is quantitative, but it may issue in a qualitative difference of life or death to the person who eats it. The difference between a rivet that breaks at one pressure and a rivet that breaks at another is quantitative; but that, too, may mean a qualitative difference of life and death. So the difference between a being who surpasses our ideals of the good and one who falls short of them is from one point of view merely quantitative; but it may be all the difference between a God and a devil, and that, from the point of view of religion, may perhaps not unreasonably be considered a difference of kind.

* "Natural Religion," p. 23.

It is clear that, from the point of view of science, the good is often thwarted. In that case I conceive we are shut down to two alternatives about the God revealed in science, who is so much patronized by advanced thinkers. He may be entirely indifferent to good or evil. In that case he cannot be a spiritual being. Every spiritual being must have some end which it proposes to itself, and that end is its own good,—true or false according as the spirit is high or low. The good of a spirit higher than ourselves might far exceed ours, but must embrace it, and a power absolutely regardless of either good or evil must be unspiritual. Such a power would be mere blind chance, and such a power, it seems to me, we can have no right to admire or reverence. We may reverence that which fulfils our idea of good, we may reverence still more that which surpasses it; but that which has no relation to the good, has no claim to reverence. It is stronger than we are, no doubt; but to reverence it on this ground seems to me, I confess, an error much of the same sort, though enormously more flagrant, as estimating the artistic worth of a picture by the square feet it covers.

Or, on the other hand, the God of Science may have regard to good and evil. In that case he put the evil there, knowing it was such. Now, dogma might possibly say that evil was a means to an end, or transitory, or unreal; but without dogma we have no reason to believe that the evil is less part of the purpose of the universe than good, for science is strictly impartial between them. In that case we must suppose that the evil was put there as evil; and as we can scarcely plead for a God, even a God of science, that he was misled by ignorance, or tempted by circumstances, we must suppose that he put the evil there because he liked it. In which case the God of science seems to bear a fairly close relation to the devil of theology.

The author of "Natural Religion" has, however, given a quite different definition of religion. He calls it "the influence which draws men's thoughts away from their personal interests, making them intensely aware of other existences to which it binds them by strong ties, sometimes of admiration,

sometimes of awe, sometimes of duty, sometimes of law." * To adapt Matthew Arnold's definition, we might call religion "life touched by enthusiasm." Doubtless for this we can dispense with dogma. We can be enthusiastic about truth, even though it be horrible or evil, we can be enthusiastic about virtue, though it is doomed to failure. Only, in this case, why call it religion? The word always has been used in the past, if not always to include explicit optimism, at any rate to exclude explicit pessimism. And this creed by no means excludes explicit pessimism.

And there is something more serious, for the use of the word "religion" in this case gives an unfair advantage to those who use it. Because religion has always excluded explicit pessimism, because for the last nineteen centuries this could only have been done by the assertion of explicit optimism, because religion has meant a belief in some infinite and eternal good, because it has meant an assurance of utter harmony and of the peace which passes understanding,—therefore the word has a charm and a significance as of something supremely good. And I think that, doubtless unconsciously, the people who use the word for nothing higher than an enthusiasm for virtue, profit, and to some extent deceive themselves, by transferring with the name the mystery and the restfulness which only clung about it in respect of its older meaning.

Still, if it pleases any one to use the word religion for a state of mind which may include utter despair of the destinies of all things, utter contempt and defiance of the universe, and of its creator, if it have one,—this is a free country and he can use what words he likes,—only we say, in that case, that if dogma is not important for religion, it is all-important for the happiness and dignity of our own lives.

It will depend on dogma whether we are bound to conceive the universe as governed by a being incurably malicious, or one whose blind caprice is as thwarting to us as malice could be, or whether, on the other hand, we may trust that the

* "Natural Religion," p. 236.

highest ideals and aspirations of our own nature are realized, and far more than realized, in the ultimate reality, implicit now, and some day to be explicit. It will depend on dogma whether we can regard the troubles of the present and the uncertainties of the future with the feelings of a mouse towards a cat or of a child towards his father. It will depend on dogma whether we regard our lives as worth living only as desperate efforts to make the best of an incurably bad job, or whether we can regard them as a passage to a happiness that it has not entered into our hearts to conceive. It will depend upon dogma whether we regard our pleasures as episodes which will soon pass, or our sorrows as delusions which will soon be dispelled. It will depend upon dogma whether we regard ourselves as temporary aggregations of atoms, or as God incarnate. I must confess that I am egoistic enough to regard the point as one of some interest.

And so I find myself lamentably "out of touch," to use their own language, with the advanced thinkers of the present day. I cannot be certain that the difference between *δημοουσιος* and *δημοιουσιος* was so unimportant as it appears to certain energetic preachers of tolerance. In fact, I sometimes ask whether the zeal of these excellent men is not becoming a little contradictory, and am not without my fears that, if this demand for tolerance goes on increasing, I may find myself in some inquisition of the twentieth century for the crime of attaching some importance to the question of my own immortality. I have a haunting suspicion that, in spite of our present enlightenment, it may after all be the things which are not seen which are eternal, and sometimes go so far as to hope that the investigation of our relations with the Absolute and the Divine may again come to be thought almost as serious an occupation as the counting of beetles' legs or the abolition of taverns.

Dogma, as I admitted before, means division. But it may, perhaps, be doubted whether you can get any unity worth preserving by the process immortalized by Mr. Saunders McKaye of first stripping mankind of their clothes, and then proclaiming them brothers "on the gran' fundamental prin-

principle o' want o' breeks." The insides of two empty boxes are no doubt singularly alike. But a unity of this sort may possibly be overvalued.

It does not, of course, follow that dogma will deliver us from our troubles. We cannot set out on an inquiry and pre-judge the answer. If we begin to inquire into what lies behind phenomena, the answer may be even more depressing than the superficial aspect of the phenomena themselves. But the only possible line of escape lies in this direction. Whether we take the path of revelation or of metaphysics, we must go behind experience for any view of the universe that we can hold to be truly satisfactory.

It is here, as it seems to me, that the strength of the so-called revealed religions of the world lies. They are, at any rate, formally adequate to the purpose with which they set out. They have, in their own estimation, reconciled the two great postulates of our nature. They have, somehow, arrived at the conclusion that Omnipotence and Benevolence are united. They may be entirely unjustified in their conclusions. Their conceptions of Benevolence may have been of the most remarkable nature. But they were, at any rate, of some importance to the people who believed in them. The gifts they promised were worth taking. They changed the aspect of heaven and earth for those who believed them. But the systems in which we are invited to put our faith to-day seem mostly based on the hypothesis that you can make things in general worthy of admiration by spelling them with enough capital letters.

As I said at the beginning of this paper, the result which we reach is by no means entirely satisfactory, for to reach the truth, which alone can make us free, only two roads have ever been suggested,—that of so-called revelation and that of metaphysics. Now every year fewer people appear willing to believe in the rationality and the righteousness of the universe on the ground of revelation. And even if every one who studied metaphysics arrived at idealist conclusions,—which, unfortunately, is not the case,—yet the study of metaphysics is only open to those who have a certain amount of natural

and acquired fitness for it. The number of people who will be left between the rapidly-receding trust in revelation and the slowly-advancing trust in philosophy is unpleasantly large. Whitechapel in particular will probably lose its faith in revelation sometime before it adopts, with any approach to unanimity, any form of idealistic philosophy. And the idea of a large number of people with nothing to hope for in the future, and not much to live for in the present, is not a very cheerful prospect, either for them or for society.

But we shall gain nothing by not facing the facts. If the supply of bread runs short, we shall gain nothing by distributing stones. Such a course may have two positively evil effects. It may persuade the ungrateful recipients, not only that there is a deficiency of food, but that there is no such thing as food at all. And it may prolong the scarcity, or even render it perpetual, by turning men's minds to quarries rather than to wheat-fields, as the source from which may arise some satisfaction for their desires.

J. ELLIS McTAGGART.

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THE JUVENILE OFFENDER, AND THE CONDITIONS WHICH PRODUCE HIM.*

THE subject which I have selected for consideration this evening is the juvenile offender and the conditions which produce him, or rather which tend to produce him. I have chosen this topic, because it has been an important part of my daily duty for a considerable number of years to come into close and constant contact with large numbers of the juvenile delinquent population, and thus to see the youthful offender at first hand as he really is. In the second place, I have chosen this subject because I am sorry to have to tell you that our present methods of punishment by imprisonment

* A lecture to the Cambridge Ethical Society.